Essential Windows Event IDs for Every Administrator

Every Windows administrator should focus on these critical event IDs for security monitoring and troubleshooting. This list is organized by category based on Microsoft’s official documentation and real-world incident response experience.

Authentication and Logon Events (High Priority)

These events should be your first alerting priority as they directly indicate authentication issues or potential attacks.

Event IDCategoryWhat It Means
4624Successful LogonAn account successfully logged on. Check logon type (2=interactive, 3=network, 10=RDP)
4625Failed LogonFailed logon attempt. High volume = brute force attack
4648Explicit CredentialsLogon using explicit credentials (runas, net use). Rare in legitimate use – high signal value
4672Admin LogonSpecial privileges assigned (admin logon). Alert when unexpected accounts appear
4740Account LockoutUser account was locked out. Investigate if frequent
4768Kerberos TGT RequestKerberos authentication ticket request. Failures indicate credential issues
4769Kerberos Service TicketService ticket requested. Monitor for unusual service access patterns
4649Replay AttackReplay attack detected. Critical security event requiring investigation

Account and Group Changes

Event IDCategoryWhat It Means
4720User CreatedNew user account created. Often precedes privilege escalation
4724Password ResetAttempt to reset account password
4728Global Group MemberMember added to security-enabled global group
4732Local Group MemberMember added to local security group. Watch Administrators group!
4765SID History AddedSID History added to account – potential privilege escalation attack
4780Admin ACL SetACL set on admin group member accounts

Persistence Mechanisms (Critical for Security)

Attackers leave these traces when establishing backdoors:

Event IDChannelWhat It Means
7045SystemNew service installed. Common for malware and persistence
4697SecurityService installed by Security Subsystem (alternate channel)
4698SecurityScheduled task created. Monitor XML payload for actions
4702SecurityScheduled task updated. Attackers reuse legitimate task names
5861WMI-ActivityPermanent WMI consumer registered – stealthy persistence that survives reboot

Process Execution (Understanding What Ran)

Event IDChannelWhat It Means
4688SecurityProcess created. Requires “Include command line” policy enabled
4104PowerShellPowerShell script block executed. Captures deobfuscated content – invaluable for detecting encoded attacks
1SysmonProcess create with hashes and signatures (requires Sysmon installed)

Lateral Movement (Detecting Spread)

Event IDChannelWhat It Means
4624 (Type 3)SecurityNetwork logon. Burst across hosts = lateral movement indicator
4624 (Type 10)SecurityRDP logon. Unusual source IPs warrant investigation
5140SecurityNetwork share accessed
3SysmonNetwork connection from process – pairs with 4624 type 3 for attribution

Defense Evasion (Critical Alerts)

Event IDCategoryWhat It Means
1102SecurityAudit log cleared. NO legitimate reason – ALERT IMMEDIATELY
104SystemEvent log cleared (non-Security logs)
4719SecuritySystem audit policy changed. Attackers disable auditing before malicious actions
4907SecurityAuditing settings on object changed
4616SecuritySystem time changed. Can be used to hide activity or break Kerberos

Object Access and Privilege Use

Event IDCategoryWhat It Means
4660Object AccessObject deleted
4673Privilege UsePrivileged service called. Noisy; filter for specific privileges
4674Privilege UseOperation attempted on privileged object

Additional High-Severity Events

From Microsoft’s official monitoring guidance:

Event IDWhat It Means
4618Monitored security event pattern detected
4794Directory Services Restore Mode attempted
4964Special groups assigned to new logon
4897Role separation enabled

Important Note on Logging Configuration

Many critical events aren’t enabled by default. Microsoft recommends configuring:

  • Advanced Audit Policy Configuration at: Computer Configuration\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration
  • Process creation auditing to include command lines in Event 4688
  • PowerShell logging (ScriptBlock logging for Event 4104) is essential for detecting obfuscated attacks

For comprehensive coverage, consider deploying Sysmon (System Monitor) from Microsoft Sysinternals, which provides Event IDs 1, 3, and others that fill critical gaps in native Windows logging.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Quick Reference

TechniquePrimary Event IDs
Command Execution (T1059)4688, 4104
Service Persistence (T1543.003)7045, 4697
Scheduled Task (T1053.005)4698, 4702
Account Creation (T1136)4720, 4732, 4728
Remote Services (T1021)4624 (Type 3), 5140
Log Clearing (T1070.001)1102, 104, 4719

Focus your monitoring on this core set first, then expand based on your environment’s specific risks and compliance requirements.

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